Game theory provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand, most experimenters usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a "random strangers" design in which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so small that subjects will behave as if they are in a one-shot environment. We present evidence from public goods experiments that this claim is not always true.
1 We review the literature below. We do not consider the issue of anonymity between subject and experimenter, the so-called "double blind" designs that have been in effective other settings such as bargaining experiments. In this regard, our procedures were common to all of our experiments.
-2-systematically comparing behavior in PS and RS settings. 1 We consider as an example the classic public goods voluntary contribution game. Apart from it's intrinsic importance, it has been the context for many valuable tests of the role of Random Strangers and Partners designs. The Partners design is the polar opposite of Perfect Strangers and Random Strangers: it pits the same subjects against each other for each round.
In section 1 we briefly review the literature on various designs for anonymity, particularly in the public goods setting. In section 2 we propose and undertake a simple experimental design in which we compare the Random Strangers and Perfect Strangers designs. We find that the assumption that subjects treat Random Strangers designs as if they were one-shot experiments is false. Our subjects behave in a systematically different manner in the Perfect Strangers design. In fact, we can show that the Perfect Strangers design is associated with more subjects adopting a strict free-riding behavior consistent with the one-shot theory, rather than with subjects simply providing smaller contributions conditional on making some contribution. Thus the use of the Perfect Strangers design seems to encourage a qualitative change in the way subjects view the game, with more of them thinking the game through in the strategic manner assumed by game theory. Section 4 reviews two previous experiments that have examined Partners and Random Strangers, and shows that there results are consistent with these conclusions.
Partners, Random Strangers, and Perfect Strangers

A. Theoretical Issues
Why do we worry about Strangers designs at all, let alone whether they are Random 2 Chess reminds us that backward induction is not an "all or nothing" thing behaviorally. 3 For textbook expositions, see Fudenberg and Tirole [1991; ch.4,5] or Binmore [1992; ch.8 ].
-3-Strangers or Perfect Strangers? The short answer is that any repeated game can cause reputation effects, such that play in one round can be influenced by the expectation of meeting the same player in a later round. But the short answer is not accurate. If the game has a finite and known number of repetitions, if the stage game in any single round has only one Nash Equilibrium (NE), and if it is common knowledge that all players can backward induct for the horizon of the game, 2 then the NE of the repeated game is just a "degenerate" succession of NE of the stage games. If one relaxes any of the three conditions just noted, then there may be many NE of the repeated game that differ from degenerate, successive plays of the NE of the stage game. 3 The public good games considered in the experimental literature are virtually identical in form to the prisoners' dilemma games considered in repeated game theory. In the standard form of both games there is invariably a single NE of the stage game. Most experiments provide subjects with a known and finite horizon, computer network crashes notwithstanding. Some experiments leave the final horizon indeterminate, which can generate many of the same effects as having an infinite horizon. But the one thing we cannot easily control in experiments is the knowledge that subjects have about the other players.
So, what happens if the NE of the repeated game are not the degenerate NE of the stage game? In principle, any outcome in the public goods game is a possible NE of the repeated game, in the sense that anything between the fully cooperative outcome and the fully non-cooperative outcome can be sustained as a NE of the repeated game. Whether or not subjects can effectively devise punishment strategies to bring this about in 10 rounds is a separate matter, having to do with the fascinating question of the complexity of calculating best responses in games. It is important to 4 The same is true of the extensive early experimental literature on first-price sealed-bid auctions.
-4-note that the degenerate repetition of the NE of the stage game always remains one of the NE of the repeated game, and one that is clearly computationally easy for subjects to recognize (if they have the smarts needed to consider NE of the repeated game). Thus it is not the case that the NE of the repeated game is the fully cooperative outcome, or even "more cooperation," but that the set of outcomes that are NE is wider.
B. Previous Experiments
The experimental literature on public goods has a long tradition of being concerned with the strategic importance of differentiating between "Partners and Strangers." However, it is striking that virtually all of the Strangers designs have been what we call Random Strangers.
The earliest public goods experiments were conducted exclusively with a Partners design. 4 However, the presumption was that the game would be viewed by subjects as a finite-horizon repeated game in which the sole NE was the same outcome as the NE of the stage game. For example, Isaac and Walker [1988; p.195 ] state this position clearly:
The results across all periods are not supportive of the multi-period Nash equilibria prediction of zero contribution in every period (based upon a backwards induction argument). Instead, the experiments uniformly begin with positive contributions [...] followed by a tendency for contributions to decay. This decay pattern is consistent with the experimental results cited by Kreps et al. [1982] , and it suggests that the incomplete information models should also be a fruitful line of theoretical inquiry for public goods research.
Of course, an alternative is to consider the effects of experimental designs that mitigate the role of reputation effects under incomplete information. Andreoni [1988] initiated this approach in the experimental literature, explicitly contrasting what he termed Partners and Strangers. The Strangers design in his experiments were Random 5 The same qualitative results obtain if one uses t-tests or rank-sum tests.
-5-Strangers: 20 subjects were randomly assigned to 4 groups of 5 in each of 10 rounds. He reports that Random Strangers contributed more, on average, than Partners. This result generated a flurry of interest, as discussed below.
The basis of his conclusion is actually questionable, from his own data. At an "eyeball" level the average contributions in each treatment are compared, round by round (Table 1, p.296). Partners contribute an average of 16.6 tokens over 10 rounds, and Random Strangers contribute an average of 20.7 rounds, for a difference of 4.1 tokens. The problem, noted by Croson [1996; p.30] and Palfrey and Prisbey [1996; p.413] , is that there is a significant standard deviation in contributions, around 16 tokens in each treatment. This suggests immediately that one should consider formal statistical hypothesis tests.
The test used by Andreoni [1988; p.296, fn. 9 ] is a median test applied to all individual contributions over all rounds. The null hypothesis here is that the Partners and Random Strangers samples arise from populations with the same median, and he reports that this null can be rejected with a p-value of less than 0.01. Using the original data, we confirm this conclusion. Of course, this test assumes that the samples are random (Conover [1980; p.171]) , and this is violated by the temporal dependence between rounds and subjects. The temporal dependence can be easily controlled for by just looking at first round responses. The difference in average contributions in round 1 was only 1.3 tokens, however, and the same median test leads one to conclude that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (p-value = 0.56). 5 We examine this hypothesis later, using an econometric specification which accounts for some of the features of these data and that is comparable to the analysis of our own data. To anticipate, we find that there is no statistically significant evidence of differences between Partners and Random Strangers in the data from -6- Andreoni [1988] . Weimann [1994] undertook a replication of the Andreoni [1988] conclusion, but his experiments also changed design in a way that makes them hard to compare. In his Strangers experiments the subjects were contacted by phone, after receiving the instructions and record form in the mail, rather than in some common setting. This has the advantage of complete anonymity, of course, but it also means that the subjects cannot verify that they are being randomly paired. As it happens, two of the variations on the baseline experiments employed deception, further clouding the credibility of inferences. In any event, Weimann [1994] concludes that he did not replicate the conclusion of Andreoni [1988] . Croson [1996] replicated the Andreoni [1988] design and found different results. Although she does not report the average contributions, inspection of her Figure 1 (p.28) indicates that contributions in the Partners treatments were roughly 4 to 5 tokens higher than those in the Random Strangers treatments, relative to an endowment of 25 tokens in each round. But the same concern with the variation of individual contributions arises. She reports (Table 2, p.30) standard deviations in each treatment around 8 tokens in each round. Nonetheless, the same parametric and nonparametric tests used to evaluate the Andreoni [1988] data lead to the conclusion of significant differences, with Random Strangers contributing less overall. We also re-consider these results later, using an econometric specification to help us identify the sources of these differences. Burlando and Hey [1997] also fail to replicate the conclusion claimed by Andreoni [1988] .
They find no significant difference between Partners and Random Strangers overall, although there are some minor interaction effects depending on the national location of the experiments and the 6 The classification of these results in Andreoni and Croson [2005;  Table 1 ] does not match the conclusions of the original study. They classify the British subjects as contributing more on the Strangers design compared to the Partners design, whereas the original study finds no difference; they classify the Italian subjects as contributing more in the Partners design compared to the Strangers design, but this is due to some differences following a restart, rather than in initial rounds of behavior. Burlando and Hey [1997; p.53-4] note that "... for the UK subjects the partners percentage was 86.64 as compared to 85.65 for the strangers -a difference that is not statistically significant (p=0.2073); for the Italians, the partners percentage was 70.62 as compared with 73.38 for the strangers -a difference that is significant according to a [Wilcoxon rank-sum test] at 1% (p=0.0051). Interestingly, this difference is largely driven by the difference in behavior between the first and second sub-sessions among the Italian subjects -in the second sub-session partners free-rode much less than strangers [...] . Perhaps by then they had learned that co-operation was a good thing?" The percentages they refer to are the percentages of the bad that was placed in the public domain. So "dumping" more in the public domain here amounts to free riding more and contributing less.
-7-sequencing. 6 It would be useful to see how much of the differences across nations is due to national effects rather than from differences in individual characteristics, as noted by Botelho et al. [2005] in the context of cross-national bargaining experiments, but the raw data on individual characteristics was not collected for the British subjects (p.47, fn.10). Palfrey and Prisbey [1996] conduct an experiment that compares Partners and Random Strangers, along with other treatments. Their subjects participated in 40-round games, broken into 4 treatments. In each round the subject received a random "exchange rate" that would convert their tokens into points. Each subject received a different exchange rate each round, and the subjects in the same group of 4 received different exchange rates. These exchange rates were drawn uniformly at random as integers between 1 and 20. In the first 20 rounds each subject received a fixed group return, and then a new, fixed group return in the last 20 rounds. These returns were "low" and then "high." In each 10-round sequence each subject received a random private return. Subjects were either in a Partners treatment for the entire 40 rounds or in a Random Strangers treatment for the entire 40 rounds. They find average contributions of 3.46 tokens in the Partners treatment and 3.71 in the Random Strangers treatment, out of endowments of 9 tokens. The standard deviation of each is 3.68 tokens and 3.60 tokens. One cannot reject the null hypothesis of identical mean contribution 7 Andreoni and Croson [2005; Table 1 ] and Keser and van Winden [2000; p. 24 ] claim that these data show that Strangers contribute more than Partners, but this may just be due to them being willing to accept a p-value this high. 8 Keser and van Winden [2000; p. 24 ] claim that these data show that Strangers have a higher variance in contributions than Partners, but this is likely due to a misreading of a claim by Palfrey and Prisbey [1996; p.424] about the dispersion in the fitted parameter of a specific model estimated from these treatments.
-8-levels using a t-test (p=0.13), 7 nor can one reject the null hypothesis of identical variances in contributions using an F-test (p=0.51). 8 These results are even stronger if one only considers the responses in the first round, although sample sizes become very small since there were only 24 subjects in each of the main treatments. Keser and van Winden [2000] provide convincing evidence that Partners contribute more than Random Strangers in stationary public good experiments. A key feature of their design was simply to increase the number of replications in each treatment, so that they had 6 sessions with the Random Strangers treatment and 10 sessions with the Partners treatment, spanning 160 subjects.
They found that average contributions were 1.9 tokens and 4.53 tokens, out of an endowment of 10, across the two treatments. Andreoni and Croson [2005] review the literature on public goods contributions with Partners and Random Strangers. They discuss additional studies examining these treatments, but in which there was some other design change. Fehr and Gächter [2000; fn.3 ] report that the results of a Perfect Strangers replication of their design generated essentially the same results as their ordinary Strangers experiments. However, they only considered one sequence of regimes (Punishment followed by Non-Punishment), and did not maintain the Perfect Strangers treatment after the first regime of 6 periods. In other words, subjects that were matched only once in rounds 1-6 might have been matched again in rounds 7-12, thereby reducing the Perfect Strangers control. Moreover, one would have to control for the history 9 Most public goods experiments use four subjects per group, although the effect of larger group sizes has been studied by Isaac and Walker [1988] and others. Harrison and Hirshleifer [1989] and Goeree, Holt and Laury [2002] employed groups of 2 in their public goods experiments.
-9-generated by following a related experiment, as we do below, to be able to draw any inferences about the effects of Perfect Strangers rather than Random Strangers in a Non-Punishment game.
Rather than debate if such comparisons are conclusive, we prefer to ensure the control against any reputational effects afforded by a Perfect Strangers design.
Experimental Design
Each subject participated in an experimental session in which there were 10 rounds of a traditional voluntary contribution public goods game. Subjects participate in groups of 2 in each round. 9 We explain in great detail how we ensure that there is no chance that they will meet the same person in any other round.
Our experiments also had some other task after the initial 10 rounds, or in a prior 10 rounds.
This task was a "sanctions" public goods game in the spirit of Fehr and Gächter [2000] . The results of those experiments are not of interest here, but we control for them in the statistical analysis. subject received an endowment of 20 tokens at the outset of each round, and each token was worth 5 cents.
In two sessions we used a relatively low return on contributions to the public good, and in all other sessions we used a relatively high return. The low return was 0.6 of token: hence every token contributed to the public good by one subject would decrease their private endowment by 1 token and return 0.6 of a token for herself. Of course, it would also generate 0.6 of a token for the other 10 Isaac and Walker [1988] carefully discuss the relationship between changes in group size and the implied MPCR. They use MPCR values of 0.3 and 0.75, and refer to the latter as high. So our values tend to be "high" in relation to the ones they consider.
11 Alternative assumptions about the factors motivating subjects to contribute in public goods experiments have long been studied. See, in particular, Palfrey and Prisbrey [1996] [1997] and Goeree, Holt and Laury [2002] . 12 UCF is located in Orlando, Florida. It has a large student body, with Fall 2004 enrollment of 42,837. The entering class in 2004 had an average SAT of 1,186. The student body is also ethnically divers: in 2004 8.5% stated that they were Black and Non-Hispanic; 70% stated that they were White and Non-Hispanic; 5.0% stated that they were Asian; and 12.2% stated that they were Hispanic. 13 All instructions, scripts, and software are available at http://exlab.bus.ucf.edu. The latest version of the z-Tree software and documentation is available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/ztree/index.php.
-10-player, so the social return was 1.2 tokens for every 1 token invested. In the high return treatment we changed the public good return from 0.6 to 0.8, thereby increasing the social return from 20% to 60%. The objective of this treatment was to see the effects of making the environment more rewarding to anything that would increase contributions to the public good. In terms of the marginal per capita return (MPCR) to contributing, which is just the ratio of the return from the public good contribution to the return from the implicit private good contribution, these are 0.60 and 0.80, respectively. 10 We used a linear payoff schedule which was constant for all contributions, so the dominant strategy is simple: a subject that only seeks to maximize individual earnings in a single period should contribute nothing to the public good. 11 We recruited 142 subjects from the University of Central Florida (UCF) in 2005. 12 Subjects were randomly assigned to each session, with no prior knowledge of the parameters or treatments.
The sessions were all conducted at the Behavioral Research Lab of the College of Business Administration of UCF. This facility is a standard, computerized laboratory: each station has a "sunken" monitor, and we employed personal "cubicle-style" screens to ensure even more privacy.
Instructions were provided in written form and orally, and the experiment was implemented using version 2.1.4 of the z-Tree software developed by Fischbacher [1999] . 13 The same experimenter 14 A digital recording of the oral instructions in one typical session is available at the ExLab archive.
-11-(Rutström) delivered the oral instructions for all sessions, to ensure comparability. 14 The oral instructions also utilized a large-screen display that could be easily seen by all subjects, to ensure that certain information was common knowledge. Training rounds were included prior to each regime, to ensure that subjects understood the task.
Average earnings in these experiments were $38, including a standard $5 show-up fee. No session lasted more than 2 hours, and most were at least 1½ hours in length. each round could be 20, and we observe average contributions starting out at around 5 or 6 tokens and steadily declining. Average Perfect Strangers contributions are generally lower than those in the Random Strangers treatment. However, these raw results could be generated by any number of confounds. Two of our Perfect Strangers sessions had lower returns to the public good, there could be some effect from the previous history of the experiment, and there might be sampling differences across treatments that are associated with individual characteristics. To account for these possible effects we turn to a statistical analysis that conditions on them.
Results
Our analysis employs a likelihood function that is constructed to be appropriate for this type of experiment. Theory tells us that there may be some individuals that gravitate to one particular contribution level: contribute zero. The raw data also flag this as a "spike" that needs to be addressed explicitly. Figure 2 shows the distribution of fractional contributions in each treatment, pooled over all periods. The mode at zero is evident. Figure 3 shows the same distribution in the 15 See Coller, Harrison and McInnes [2002] for an application. 16 As is well known, one can estimate the two parts of the hurdle model separately and obtain consistent and efficient estimates (McDowell [2003] ). However, we construct the likelihood explicitly because we have to for the second part of the likelihood, and one can then incorporate attractive econometric features such as clustered sampling.
-12-initial round, and the difference between Random Strangers and Perfect Strangers is even more striking. More subjects seem to focus on the zero contribution from the outset in the Perfect Strangers environment. Our statistical analysis therefore considers the process by which some subject decides to contribute zero or some positive amount as separate from the process by which the subject decides how much to contribute.
The most natural specification to capture this intuition from theory and the raw data is a "hurdle model." This specification is common in health economics, for example, where it is used to capture the idea that the factors that cause someone to seek medical care are distinct from the factors that cause the doctor and patient to decide how much to spend. 15 In this case going to the doctor is the hurdle that must be passed before expenditures would be positive. In our case the subject has to decide whether to contribute any amount at all, and only then does the process determining the positive contribution level apply.
The likelihood function for the overall hurdle model is therefore constructed as the product of two likelihoods. 16 The first component is the likelihood that the subject contributed zero or not, and uses a standard probit specification defined over an index function x i ", where " is a parameter vector to be estimated and x i is a vector of explanatory variables for observation i. The second component is the conditional likelihood that the subject contributed a certain fraction of the endowment. This likelihood function is constructed using the specification developed by Papke and Wooldridge [1996] for fractional dependant variables, since the dependant variable in this case is the fraction of the endowment contributed (conditional on any positive contribution). Thus the log-17 This variable takes on the value 0 for the Perfect Strangers treatment and the size of the group (from Table 1 ) for the Random Strangers treatments. Thus it can be viewed as an interaction between the Perfect Strangers treatment and group size.
-13-likelihood of observation i is defined as l i ($) = C i × log[G(x i $)] + (1-C i ) × log[1-G(x i $)] for contribution fraction C i , parameter vector $, and some convenient cumulative distribution function G(@). We use the standard normal cumulative distribution function G(z) = M(z). Thus the overall likelihood function for the hurdle model requires the joint estimation of " and $.
Explanatory variables include individual demographics and treatment effects. Binary dummy variables are included for the Perfect Strangers designs (Pstrangers), the size of the session conditional on the use of a Random Strangers design (Ssize), 17 the history during periods 1-10 (np_p), and the use of high rewards to contributing to the public good (High). Demographics include a measure of age in years (Age), binary indicators for sex (Male), race (Black, Asian, Hispanic or Other Race), academic major (Business), class standing (PreSenior), cumulative GPA below 3¼ (GPAlow), cumulative GP above 3¾ (GPAhigh), number of people in the subject's household (Hhsize), and a binary indicator of those that work part-time or full-time (Work). Table 2 lists descriptive statistics for these variables. Table 3 provides maximum likelihood estimates of the hurdle model for these data. All estimates for the " parameter represent the calculated marginal effect of that variable on the probability of contributing. The reported estimates for the $ are the marginal effects in terms of the positive fraction of tokens contributed.
The focus variable is the Pstrangers binary dummy. It clearly has a large and statistically significant effect on the decision to contribute something or nothing, and virtually no impact on the level of positive contributions. This is striking evidence that the Perfect Strangers treatment affects qualitative behavior, in the sense that it elicits more subjects to focus on the zero contribution response. Subjects are 18 The size of the marginal effect for each period appears to be too large, but is appropriate given that each dummy has an average sample value of 0.1, and the effects are each measured relative to period 1.
-14-on average 40 percentage points more likely to be free riders in the Perfect Strangers treatments, and this effect is statistically significant (p-value = 0.013).
We also find that the ordering of the experiments, as first or second in the real-time sequence, also makes a large difference to contributions. When the experiment comes before the other task, and np_p = 1, the probability of being a free rider is 0.24 lower on average.
Increases in the reward to contributing to the public good are associated with significant reductions in free riding, and significant increases in the amount contributed when someone does contribute something.
As expected, the passage of time increases the likelihood of a subject becoming a free rider.
The marginal effects of the period dummies on " in Table 3 show a significant and steady decline after period 3. 18 There are some clear demographic effects on contributions, particularly in terms of the fraction of contributions conditional on making any contribution. Men are actually more generous once they decide to contribute, even though there is an offsetting (and less statistically significant) effect on the decision to contribute. Those with a lower GPA are much more likely to contribute something. Asians contribute much less than whites, conditional on contributing anything, whereas Other Races are much more generous once they decide to contribute. 19 Generously provided by James Andreoni and Rachel Croson. 20 The only effect that we observe is a fascinating one in terms of the underlying static game theory: an end-period effect. Andreoni [1988; p.295] explains that "... we expect that giving by Partners will be greater than giving by [Random] Strangers, especially early in the game (before the Partners begin to 'bail out'). In the tenth round, however, both Partners and Strangers are playing an end-game, hence both are predicted to free ride." However, in the last round we find that Random Strangers are 17 percentage points more likely to contribute some amount, and this effect is statistically significant (p-value = 0.028). This end-game effect is not sufficient overall to offset the conclusion that Random Strangers and Partners are behaving similarly in these experiments.
-15-
Comparisons to the Previous Experiments
Our econometric model of contributions allows us to re-examine the data from the previous experiments of Andreoni [1988] and Croson [1996] using statistical methods that are comparable to our own. Using data on individual contributions, 19 we estimate the same hurdle model with controls for the key Partners versus Random Strangers treatment. We also include fixed effects for each round, and interact those with the Partners/Strangers treatment.
Our results confirm our re-analysis of the Andreoni [1988] conclusions using unconditional tests, reported earlier. We find no statistically significant difference between Partners and Random Strangers in his data. There is generally no difference in terms of whether subjects decide to contribute anything at all, or in terms of what level of contribution they would make if positive. We do find statistically significant round effects, but these are common to the Partners and Random Strangers treatments. 20 Thus the results from Andreoni [1988] are weakly consistent with ours, in the sense that they provide no evidence that our conclusions are wrong.
The data from the experiments of Croson [1996] , however, tell a story that is completely consistent with our findings. Estimating the same statistical model with her data, over all 20 rounds, we find a huge effect from Random Strangers on the propensity to free ride, and no effect at all on the level of contributions conditional on making any. Random Strangers are 42.5 percentage points less likely overall to make any contribution, and this is a significant effect (p-value = 0.004). They are -16-estimated to contribute 11.1 percentage points more conditional on making any contribution at all, but this is not statistically different from zero (p-value = 0.31).
Conclusions
We find a significant effect from the use of a design that ensures perfect anonymity between subjects. Our experiment and statistical analysis provide evidence that it not only moves subjects towards the prediction of standard theory for one-shot games, but it significantly increases the fraction of subjects that behave according to the one-shot prediction from the outset. We conjecture that perfect anonymity will have comparable effects in other strategic experimental tasks in which there may be effects from the subjects behaving as if in a repeated game. 
